I. Introduction
Appellant Erica V. Saxton, pro se, submits this Opposition to Appellees' Motion for Extension of Time to File Principal Brief, filed June 1, 2026. On May 21, 2026, Intermountain's counsel asked Appellant to stipulate to a sixty-day extension. On May 26, 2026, counsel articulated the grounds for that request: the complexity of the appeal, the length of the briefing, the iterative drafting and client-review process Intermountain anticipated undertaking, and a preference for one longer extension over sequential shorter ones. Appellant declined on May 28, 2026. Intermountain then filed the present motion on June 1, 2026.
The filed motion materially departs from the grounds articulated in counsel's May 26 email. Appellant references the email correspondence only to explain why she declined to stipulate and to compare the reasons Intermountain gave before filing with the grounds asserted in its motion. The motion does not lead with complexity or length. It instead advances a new ground — that Appellant's use of artificial intelligence to prepare her brief requires Intermountain to "check every citation for accuracy with particular attentiveness." Motion at 3. That characterization was not offered to Appellant when she was asked to stipulate, and it does not appear in counsel's prior correspondence. The discrepancy between the grounds Intermountain offered to Appellant and the grounds it has presented to this Court is itself relevant to whether good cause has been shown.
Stipulation is a form of affirmative agreement. Appellant cannot give that agreement in the posture of this case. The underlying claim concerns medical harm that adversarial-defense conduct caused or compounded, in a statutory and ethical context in which Utah law specifically protects healthcare providers and entities who choose candid disclosure and resolution-oriented engagement with their patients. See Utah Code §§ 78B-3-450 to -454 (Medical Candor Act); id. § 78B-3-406(8) (apology protection); Utah R. Evid. 408, 409. Throughout these proceedings, Intermountain has not initiated, proposed, or accepted any settlement, mediation, or resolution-oriented engagement, and its present motion identifies no such purpose for the additional sixty days sought. The extension is requested for continued adversarial briefing. In that posture, Appellant cannot affirmatively agree to extend the very form of conduct that the underlying claim arises from; she can only ask the Court to evaluate the request on the record and impose any safeguards necessary to prevent further one-sided prejudice.
For the reasons set out below, Appellant respectfully submits that Intermountain's motion fails on that record. The AI-citation ground is not a showing of good cause: citation verification is standard professional practice regardless of drafting method, and Intermountain has access to research and verification tools that substantially exceed those available to Appellant, who personally verified every citation in the Opening Brief using publicly available resources. The complexity ground cannot be reconciled with this Court's own repeated characterization of this appeal as "relatively narrow" across four orders dating from October 2025 through May 2026. The caseload and iterative-process grounds reflect scheduling preferences, not circumstances Intermountain could not have anticipated when the briefing schedule was set. And the request is irreconcilable with Intermountain's own July 2025 position, in which it urged this Court to require Appellant to proceed "without additional delay," invoked the "extraordinary circumstances" warning this Court had applied to Appellant, and offered her productivity as evidence that no further time was warranted. Intermountain now seeks sixty days — twice the standard period — on grounds that do not approach the threshold it urged this Court to apply to her.
In the event the Court grants any extension notwithstanding Appellant’s objection, Appellant respectfully requests that the extension be conditioned on the reciprocal safeguards set forth in Section II and that the Court consider the prejudice described in Section IV.D. Those safeguards are necessary to preserve the parties’ relative position consistent with 28 C.F.R. § 35.160(a)(1) and the reciprocity principle this Court invoked under Utah R. App. P. 24(h).
II. Relief Requested
Appellant respectfully requests that the Court:
1. Deny Intermountain’s motion. On the record before this Court, an extension longer than seven additional days would compound the harms preserved in Appellant’s Opening Brief, the May 22, 2026 Motion for Accommodation, and the procedural asymmetries identified below. A seven-day limit also preserves the briefing schedule around Appellant’s pre-existing September 2026 commitments described in Section IV.C.
2. In the event the Court grants any extension, Appellant requests the following conditions:
(a) Order that Appellant’s sixty-day reply-brief period—already established by this Court’s May 26, 2026 Order—run from service of Intermountain’s brief and be extended automatically, day-for-day, by the length of any extension Intermountain receives, without requiring further motion or good-cause showing from Appellant.
(b) Order that, to the extent Intermountain’s brief exceeds 14,000 words, Appellant’s reply-brief word limit be increased automatically, without further motion, by a number of words bearing a reasonable relationship to Intermountain’s enlargement. In the alternative, Appellant requests a one-for-one increase mirroring the reciprocity principle in Rule 24(h).
(c) Order that any further extension request by Intermountain shall require a renewed showing of good cause specific to circumstances arising after the date of this order.
The relief in paragraph 2(b) is consistent with this Court’s May 26, 2026 disposition deferring the proportionate-words question. Its quantum is contingent on what Intermountain actually uses and calibrated to what Appellant has already shown in prior motions.
III. PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. This Court has consistently characterized this appeal as relatively narrow.
On October 8, 2025, this Court denied Appellant’s motion for an enlarged opening-brief word count, observing that “the relevant procedural and legal posture of the underlying case appears to be relatively narrow” and that the dispositive rulings below—motion to dismiss and summary judgment—are reviewed for legal correctness rather than on fact-intensive grounds. Order at 1–2 (Oct. 8, 2025). The Court allowed 3,000 additional words and directed Appellant to focus her issues. Subsequent orders on October 20, 2025, November 28, 2025, and May 26, 2026 maintained that framing, capping Appellant’s brief at 17,000 words and describing the reply scope as “narrow.”
B. Intermountain has had advance exposure to this appeal’s substance since October 2025.
Appellant served a proposed overlength brief on Intermountain in October 2025. Intermountain has therefore had approximately seven months of advance exposure to the appeal’s substantive issues, arguments, and cited authority prior to the Opening Brief’s filing on May 8, 2026. Additionally, much of the case law, statutory authority, and court rules cited in the Opening Brief was also cited in the underlying case proceedings, to which Intermountain’s counsel was a party.
C. This Court has expressly characterized time as Appellant’s accommodation.
In its February 7, 2025 Order, this Court stated: “This court has granted accommodations related to the time for filing of Saxton’s brief, which is intended to provide Saxton with the time needed to process information and draft written materials for the court. That accommodation is reasonable and appropriate.” Order at 2–3 (Feb. 7, 2025). The Order denied all further accommodation requests and stated: “Any further requests for additional accommodations will be returned to Saxton without further consideration by this court.” Id. at 3. Consistent with that framing, the Court’s May 26, 2026 Order denied Appellant’s requests for an auxiliary communication aid, an established expanded reply word count, a stay, and reimbursement of self-funded accommodation costs, while granting double the standard reply time.
Intermountain’s motion describes these time-based extensions as “repeated and generous extensions and other accommodations,” Motion at 2, without identifying what “other accommodations” the Court has provided. The record does not support that characterization. Time is, on this Court’s own repeated characterization, the sole accommodation it has afforded Appellant in this appeal.
Intermountain’s reference to the number of days between the original briefing notice and Appellant’s filing date omits the procedural reason that time accumulated. Much of that period was consumed by Appellant’s efforts to obtain disability-related access, including proceedings and motions addressing effective communication, accommodation, and the Rule 19 process. The accumulated time therefore does not show that Appellant received multiple effective accommodations. It reflects, in substantial part, this Court’s reliance on extensions of time as the primary accommodation mechanism in place of the auxiliary aids and accommodation structure Appellant repeatedly requested, while Appellant consistently objected that time alone was not an effective substitute and would itself create substantial prejudice, including as explained in the May 22, 2026 Motion for Accommodation docketed May 26, 2026.
D. Intermountain’s prior litigation position is in direct tension with the present request.
On July 28, 2025, Intermountain opposed any further pause in this appeal, “respectfully request[ing] that the Court set a briefing schedule that will move this appeal toward prompt resolution” and asking the Court to require Appellant to file “without additional delay.” Response at 2 (July 28, 2025). To support that request, Intermountain invoked this Court’s “extraordinary circumstances” warning against Appellant and offered, as evidence that she did not need additional time, the example of her sixty-four-page, approximately 16,000-word reply memorandum she had drafted in approximately thirty-seven days. Id. at 3 n.2.
Intermountain now seeks sixty days—nearly double the time it held up as evidence Appellant did not need—on grounds that include the complexity of the same appeal this Court has characterized as relatively narrow, and an iterative drafting-and-review process to which Intermountain’s own productivity-by-word-count yardstick allowed no equivalent. The contradiction between its July 2025 position and the present request is on the face of the record.
E. The grounds in the filed motion differ from the grounds offered to Appellant.
In counsel’s May 26, 2026 email, Intermountain articulated two grounds: (1) the complexity of the appeal, and (2) the length of the briefing, supported by reference to the iterative drafting and client-review process and a stated preference for one longer extension over successive shorter ones. Counsel noted that Intermountain “may file its brief sooner than the end of the sixty-day extension, but the longer extension allows for flexibility.”
The filed motion de-emphasizes complexity and substitutes a ground not raised in that email: that Appellant’s use of artificial intelligence requires citation verification “with particular attentiveness.” Motion at 3. The inconsistency between grounds offered to Appellant when stipulation was sought and grounds now presented to this Court is relevant to whether the motion reflects operational need or post-hoc justification.
IV. Argument
A. The sixty-day request is disproportionate and lacks individualized justification.
The standard response-brief period is thirty days. Utah R. App. P. 26(a). A sixty-day request is twice that standard, sought by an institutional party represented by no fewer than four attorneys with paralegal and legal-assistant support of no less than five (See Exhibit A). Extensions beyond stipulation are disfavored, and an extension of this magnitude requires individualized justification rather than general reference to caseload, length, or internal process. Intermountain has had the substance of the appeal available since October 2025, when they were served the first proposed over-length brief, and has not identified intervening circumstances that were not reasonably foreseeable when the briefing schedule was set. Intermountain’s reference to its counsel’s “full caseload of matters besides this appeal,” Motion at 3, does not supply that justification: caseload management is within counsel’s control, and the briefing deadline was set and known in advance.
B. Appellant’s use of AI-assisted drafting is not good cause for the requested extension.
Intermountain’s lead ground in its filed motion—that Appellant used artificial intelligence to prepare her brief and that this requires “particular attentiveness” in citation verification—does not constitute good cause. Three points bear directly on that claim.
1. Citation verification is standard professional practice regardless of drafting method. Intermountain would be obligated to verify every citation in Appellant’s brief whether it were drafted with AI assistance, a word processor, or longhand. The AI-use ground does not explain why this routine professional obligation requires sixty additional days beyond what any overlength brief would ordinarily require.
2. Intermountain’s verification resources substantially exceed Appellant’s. Counsel at Nelson Naegle, PLLC has Westlaw, law library access, attorney-specific AI research tools not available to the public, and professional research staff—resources designed specifically for legal citation work and more accurate and efficient than the general-purpose tools available to pro se litigants. Appellant verified every case, statute, court rule, federal regulation, and model jury instruction cited in the Opening Brief using publicly available resources—Google Scholar and the Utah Courts website Utah Appellate Court Opinions Search tool—without professional staff or any subscription service. Once Appellant identified workable public citation-checking resources, she completed that verification process in approximately one to two days. Appellant provides this information to answer Intermountain’s claimed AI/citation concern and to show that the concern can be addressed without a sixty-day extension. The suggestion that Intermountain requires sixty additional days for the same task, with institutional Westlaw access and a multi-attorney firm, is not a showing of need; it is a preference for additional time.
3. Intermountain had advance notice of both the citation volume and the cited authority. Appellant served a proposed overlength brief in October 2025. Much of the authority cited in the Opening Brief was also cited in the underlying case, in proceedings to which Intermountain’s counsel was a party with full opportunity to research and respond. There are no material surprises in the citation content or volume.
Appellant is prepared, if the Court requests it, to file a declaration/affidavit in the courts preferred format stating that she personally verified the cases, statutes, rules, federal regulations, and model jury instructions cited in the Opening Brief as accurate as of the date of filing. That statement is offered not because such a declaration is required, but because Intermountain’s generalized citation-accuracy concern can be addressed directly without imposing a sixty-day delay on Appellant.
C. The complexity ground cannot be reconciled with this Court’s own characterization of this appeal.
Intermountain’s complexity ground concerns the same appeal this Court has declined to treat as sufficiently complex to justify Appellant’s requested briefing enlargement or requested accommodation structure across multiple orders. The Court’s October 8, 2025 Order expressly described the posture as “relatively narrow,” characterized the dispositive rulings as legal issues reviewed for correctness, and denied the enlarged word allowance Appellant sought. Its May 26, 2026 Order described the reply scope as “narrow” and denied additional reply words as premature on the same view.
Intermountain’s description of how it would use the requested time—the iterative drafting, client-review, and revision process—describes the very iterative, resource-intensive process Appellant has identified as a function of the auxiliary aid she requested and that this Court denied her. Intermountain seeks, as routine scheduling, the iterative process Appellant must undertake without the auxiliary aid she was denied. Appellant asks only that the extension request be evaluated against the Court’s own prior characterizations of this appeal.
D. An extended timeline compounds documented harm to Appellant.
The cost of an extended timeline in this case is not abstract. A sixty-day extension would push Intermountain’s brief to approximately August 7, 2026, again moving Appellant’s briefing preparation directly into the season on which her income depends. Appellant has already incurred substantial expenses and lost work capacity while briefing under a structure in which extensions of time have been treated as the only accommodation provided. The May 22, 2026 Motion for Accommodation documents at least $536.72 in self-funded accommodation costs and over $3,000 in medical expenses attributable to participating in this appeal without effective accommodation.
Among Appellant’s documented disabilities are cognitive limitations affecting the processing of new information under time pressure and articulating concisely. An extension that gives Intermountain additional time to develop arguments Appellant will encounter for the first time on the response brief compresses the period in which Appellant must—without the auxiliary aid she requested and was denied—process those new arguments and compress them effectively. Increased preparation time for the represented institutional party operates in practical effect as compressed processing time for this disabled pro se appellant.
In addition, Appellant has, in reliance on the current briefing schedule, made commitments during September 2026 that cannot be rescheduled, including no fewer than three multi-day family obligations requiring travel planned precisely because the existing schedule made September available. A sixty-day extension would displace those commitments, requiring Appellant to choose between honoring pre-existing family obligations and meeting a reply-brief deadline she would be required to address without the auxiliary aid she requested for processing, organizing, and regulating disability-affected communication under stress.
E. The “extraordinary circumstances” standard the Court applied to Appellant has not been met by Intermountain
This Court stated in its November 18, 2024 Order: “Any further request for an extension of time will not be granted absent a showing of extraordinary circumstances.” Order at 1 (Nov. 18, 2024). The Court reiterated that standard in its September 2, 2025 Order. Intermountain itself invoked the “extraordinary circumstances” warning against Appellant in its July 28, 2025 Response, quoting that language verbatim to oppose Appellant’s request for additional time.
Intermountain’s request asks the Court to apply two different standards to the same procedural resource. When Appellant sought additional time, the Court applied a heightened threshold—which Intermountain invoked against her. When Intermountain now seeks the same resource, it has claimed no disability, identified no extraordinary circumstance, and—by its own counsel’s statement that it “may file its brief sooner than the end of the sixty-day extension” because “the longer extension allows for flexibility”—has framed its request as a preference for scheduling convenience rather than a demonstration of need. A request for additional time framed by the requesting party itself as supporting “flexibility” does not satisfy the standard the Court applied to Appellant and that Intermountain itself urged this Court to enforce.
F. Extending Intermountain’s time, without reciprocal safeguards, deepens a documented procedural asymmetry.
Intermountain’s motion illustrates prejudices Appellant has repeatedly identified from using time alone as the substitute for effective communication accommodations. The accumulated time was provided because the Court treated time as Appellant’s accommodation; Intermountain now characterizes that same time as delay and “repeated and generous extensions.” That framing shows why time alone is not an effective substitute for the auxiliary aids and accommodation structure Appellant requested: it fails to provide efficient communication support while creating a procedural record later used against the disabled litigant. And it defeats, rather than supports, Intermountain’s request for additional time: if the accumulated timeline is relevant, then Intermountain has had prolonged notice of the appeal’s issues and cannot treat those same issues as newly burdensome now.
This Court has characterized time as Appellant’s disability accommodation throughout this appeal. The same November 18, 2024 Order that established the “extraordinary circumstances” standard also characterized prior extensions as “scheduling accommodations . . . in deference to Appellant’s need for extra time in light of her disability.” Order at 1 (Nov. 18, 2024). Time and the heightened threshold for additional time were thus joined in a single order: the same procedural resource is simultaneously Appellant’s disability accommodation and subject to a heightened standard before further enlargement.
Utah R. App. P. 24(h) provides that when an overlength brief is authorized, the opposing party receives an equal number of additional words “without further order of the court.” On this record, that automatic reciprocity has operated in only one direction: Intermountain received its 4,000-word enlargement automatically, without motion practice. Appellant was required to make a good-cause showing across multiple orders, ultimately obtaining an enlargement substantially below what she requested. Intermountain now invokes its automatic enlargement as a basis for additional time, while Appellant—if any extension is granted—will again be required to motion for corresponding reply-brief adjustments.
Title II requires that communications with persons with disabilities be “as effective as” communications with others. 28 C.F.R. § 35.160(a)(1). Where the represented institutional party receives automatic scheduling relief and the disabled litigant must motion repeatedly for proportionate adjustments, an extension order that compounds that pattern is not consistent with Section 35.160(a)(1). The reciprocal conditions requested in Section II.2 are calibrated to that framework: they ask the Court to make operative, by order, the reciprocity its prior orders already contemplate, so that Appellant is not required to repeat burdensome motion practice merely to preserve proportionate time and space.
G. Utah’s voluntary medical-candor framework was available to Intermountain and was not invoked.
Utah Code §§ 78B-3-450 to -454 (Medical Candor Act) creates a provider-initiated process for candid disclosure of adverse events, with protections under Utah Rule of Evidence 409 ensuring such communications and offers of compensation are inadmissible to prove liability. Utah Code § 78B-3-406(8) separately protects expressions of apology or sympathy; Utah Rule of Evidence 408 protects compromise negotiations. These protections were and remain available to Intermountain. It has not invoked them. It now seeks substantial additional time for continued adversarial briefing, without any indication the time would be used for the resolution purposes Utah law specifically encourages and protects.
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant respectfully requests that the Court deny Intermountain’s motion or, in the alternative, grant an extension no longer than seven additional days. In either event, Appellant requests that the Court order the reciprocal time and word adjustments set forth in Section II.2(a) and (b), so that any extension preserves the parties’ relative position consistent with 28 C.F.R. § 35.160(a)(1). Appellant reiterates that she cannot affirmatively agree, by stipulation, to an extended adversarial-defense posture in a proceeding whose underlying claim concerns harm that adversarial-defense conduct caused or compounded. That objection is not abstract: continued delay prolongs the period in which the challenged institutional posture and its practical consequences remain unresolved. Appellant asks only that the Court evaluate the request on the record and, if any extension is granted, impose reciprocal safeguards adequate to prevent further one-sided prejudice.
DATED this 1st day of June, 2026.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Erica V. Saxton
Erica V. Saxton
EXHIBIT A: Stipulation Request Email
Erica Saxton <eristravels@gmail.com> Requestion for Extension of Time to File Principal Brief | Saxton v. Intermountain
Erica Saxton <eristravels@gmail.com> 27 May 2026 at 14:13 To: Landon Moore <lmoore@nelsonnaegle.com>
Cc: Cortney Kochevar <ckochevar@nelsonnaegle.com>, Sean Miller <smiller@nelsonnaegle.com>, Lance Bastian <lbastian@nelsonnaegle.com>, Ellen Harmon <eharmon@nelsonnaegle.com>, Baylei Crump
<BCrump@nelsonnaegle.com>, Tracy Lewis <tlewis@nelsonnaegle.com>, Sam Hunter <shunter@nelsonnaegle.com>, Devon Martin <dmartin@nelsonnaegle.com>
Mr. Moore,
I have considered your response. I am declining to stipulate. The complexity-based good-cause showing you have articulated intersects with prior characterizations in this appeal — including this Court's prior treatment of complexity in connection with my own briefing requests — in ways that warrant evaluation on the record rather than resolution through stipulation. The request also intersects with my pending motion for accommodation filed May 22, 2026, including specific relief requested therein concerning the timing of the reply brief.
If Intermountain elects to seek the extension by motion, I will respond on the merits. Absent such a motion, my position is that any extension is appropriately determined by the Court.
Regards,
Erica Saxton
801-726-3182
On Tue, 26 May 2026 at 13:42, Landon Moore <lmoore@nelsonnaegle.com> wrote:
Ms. Saxton,
Thank you for getting back to me. Intermountain is requesting extra time due to the complexity of the appeal and the length of the briefing. As you know, briefing seven issues for appeal is time consuming. The standard period of 30 days is based upon the assumption that the appellant's and appellee's briefs are the standard length (30 pages/14,000 words). The Court gave both of us permission to file an overlength brief, so extra time is needed to draft our overlength brief responding to your overlength brief. Intermountain did consider a shorter extension but decided to request the full sixty days so that we won't have to request another extension later. Intermountain reviews the documents we draft for them. When documents are this lengthy, it takes time for my office to draft the document, for Intermountain to review it and recommend changes, for my office to make those changes, and for Intermountain to review the document again, etc. Intermountain may file its brief sooner than the end of the sixty-day extension, but the longer extension allows for flexibility as my office communicates back and forth with Intermountain.
I hope this message provides the clarification you were seeking. Please let me know if I may send the stipulation for your review.
Landon Moore
Attorney
Nelson | Naegle
215 South State Street, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(385) 292-4400
www.nelsonnaegle.com
6/1/26, 10:16 PM Gmail - Requestion for Extension of Time to File Principal Brief | Saxton v. Intermountain From: Erica Saxton <eristravels@gmail.com>
Sent: Tuesday, May 26, 2026 11:06 AM
To: Landon Moore <lmoore@nelsonnaegle.com>
Cc: Cortney Kochevar <ckochevar@nelsonnaegle.com>; Sean Miller <smiller@nelsonnaegle.com>; Lance Bastian <lbastian@nelsonnaegle.com>; Ellen Harmon <eharmon@nelsonnaegle.com>; Baylei Crump <BCrump@nelsonnaegle.com>; Tracy Lewis <tlewis@nelsonnaegle.com>
Subject: Re: Requestion for Extension of Time to File Principal Brief | Saxton v. Intermountain You don't often get email from eristravels@gmail.com. Learn why this is important
Mr. Moore
Regarding your May 21 message about a possible stipulated extension, I need clarification on the following before I can evaluate the request:
1. The specific reasons Intermountain considers to warrant a sixty-day extension beyond the standard response period, with the specificity URAP 22(b)(3) would require if the request were made by motion.
2. Whether Intermountain has considered any extension period shorter than sixty days.
I am evaluating any stipulation against the cumulative procedural posture of this appeal and the conditions necessary for my own reply-brief preparation. The information above will allow me to consider your request on its merits.
Regards,
Erica Saxton
On Thu, 21 May 2026 at 21:31, Erica Saxton <eristravels@gmail.com> wrote:
Mr. Moore,
Acknowledging receipt of your email. I am unavailable through the holiday weekend and will respond next week. Regards,
Erica Saxton
On Thu, 21 May 2026 at 16:43, Landon Moore <lmoore@nelsonnaegle.com> wrote:
Hi Erica,
I am an attorney at Nelson Naegle assisting with drafting Intermountain's principal brief in the appeal you have brought before the Utah Court of Appeals. I am emailing you to ask about an extension of time for Intermountain to file its brief. Under Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 22, we can stipulate to an extension of up to 60 days for Intermountain to file its brief. Currently, Intermountain's brief is due June 8, 2026. A sixty-day extension will make the brief due August 7, 2026. Are you willing to agree to this extension? If so, I will send you the stipulation for your review and approval.
Thank you.
Landon Moore
Attorney
Nelson | Naegle
215 South State Street, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(385) 292-4400
www.nelsonnaegle.com
CAUTION: External Sender.
